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Introduction
PATTERNING RIGHTS CONSTITUTIONALISM: THIRTY YEARS 
WITH THE CHARTER
BENJAMIN L. BERGER * & JAMIE CAMERON **
 
WRITING YEARS BEFORE THE PATRIATION of the Canadian constitution in 1982, 
the great Canadian constitutional scholar, advocate, and poet, F.R. Scott refl ected 
on the moment of constitutional change and the political, normative, and even 
aesthetic registers in which such a moment sounds:
Changing a constitution confronts a society with the most important choices, for in 
the constitution will be found the philosophical principles and rules which largely 
determine the relations of the individual and of cultural groups to one another and 
to the state. If human rights and harmonious relations between cultures are forms of 
the beautiful, then the state is a work of art that is never fi nished. Law thus takes its 
place, in its theory and practice, among man’s highest and most creative activities.1
Did the poet overtake the constitutional scholar when Scott put pen to 
paper? To the contrary, the life and travails of the Canadian constitution thirty 
years since the Constitution Act, 1982,2 and the introduction of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms,3 have proven the truth of Scott’s words, in all of the creative 
struggle, ambition, and cultural complexity that they refl ect.  
In those thirty years, the Charter has reached a point of maturity that enables 
us to refl ect from a wider perspective on how rights protection has transformed 
Canada’s legal and political culture. As Michael Ignatieff  suggests in his preface 
to this special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal, the story of the Charter at 
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.
** Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.
1.  Frank R. Scott, Essays on the Constitution: Aspects of Canadian Law and Politics (Toronto 
and Buff alo: University of Toronto Press, 1977) at ix.
2.  Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
3.  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
(2013) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNALviii
home is one of both continuity and signifi cant change. In Scott’s terms, “human 
rights and harmonious relations between cultures” are “forms of the beautiful” that 
defi ned our tradition long before the Charter. Yet by stitching a rights-protecting 
instrument into the Canadian constitutional fabric, the Charter aff orded the 
Canadian public, politicians, and legal actors a new language of social and political 
justice. Although this language shares a lexicon with modern universal rights 
movements and with rights-protecting instruments in other traditions, its syntax 
remained insistently Canadian. Sujit Choudhry’s contribution to this volume 
shows how this is so, off ering a perspective on how the concepts of religious freedom 
and equality expressed in the Charter may be shaped by the deeper roots 
of cultural diff erence and constitutional history based in Quebec’s distinctive 
history within Canada. John Borrows’ article on Aboriginal treaty rights 
and violence against women similarly shows, albeit in a very diff erent context, 
the way in which the new languages of the 1982 Constitution off ered—and 
may continue to off er—promise and resources for progressive change. Yet 
he also shows that a new text—and even a new confi guration of power within 
the branches of government— has as yet proven insuffi  cient to lift the anchor 
on transformative change in the direction of social and historical justice. In her 
assessment of the social justice legacy of the fi rst thirty years of the Charter, 
Margot Young points to the persistent infl uence of fundamental philosophical 
and political commitments in shaping and limiting the progressive potential of 
constitutional adjudication. Her article in this volume shows the provocative mix of 
transformation and continuity, and of meaningful legal victories and disappointing 
social justice shortfalls, that has characterized constitutional life with the Charter.  
Th e historical particularities surrounding the introduction of the Charter under-
score in dramatic fashion this dynamic, ever-evolving character of constitutional life. 
Over a century after Canada’s constitution was established, the Charter reconfi gured 
constitutional democracy and reshaped the distribution of legal and political 
authority within the institutions of government. And as is often the case with 
new languages, with a discourse of rights and judicial review came new modes 
of thought and new possibilities for criticism. Th e Charter made Canada a 
hotspot for constitutional theorizing and refl ection on the political philosophy that 
subtends our constitutional tradition in particular and the nature of constitutions 
in general. In her article in this issue, Avigail Eisenberg refl ects on the mutual 
imbrications of rights discourse, identity politics, judicial review, and democratic 
institutions that have emerged over the course of three decades under the Charter. 
Her critical review of the Charter’s legacy, and the risks and promises of identity 
politics in rights litigation off ers rich insight into the shifting nature of our 
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political and institutional commitments. Colleen Sheppard similarly draws 
lessons from the Charter experience about how the core project of constitutionalism 
might be conceived. In her contribution to this issue, she considers the democratic 
import of rights-protecting constitutions inhering in their process-based eff ects—
namely, their infl uence on voice and inclusion—rather than principally in the 
substantive content of their normative prescriptions. Gavin Anderson picks up 
the important thread of critical legal scholarship on rights and judicial review, 
so active in Canada after the introduction of the Charter, and imagines the 
future fault lines and frontiers in critical constitutional thought; he invites 
us to imagine a sociological and transnational turn in constitutional theory that 
would be responsive to challenges of social justice in modern democratic life. Th e 
contributors to this special issue remind us that critical refl ection on the legacy of 
the Charter is also a kind of philosophical refl ection on the nature of constitutions 
and political communities at large.
In its distinctive agonistic expression of democratic supremacy and rights 
protection, the Canadian constitutional model—and the operation and impact 
of the Charter in particular—has infl uenced constitutional design, practice, and 
theory around the world. Since 1982, the Charter has been looked to in the 
design of parliamentary and constitutional bills of rights in New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, Australian states, South Africa, and Israel. As a result, the 1982 
Constitution moved Canada into a central position in the comparative study of 
rights constitutionalism. In this way, the 1982 Constitution moved Canada into a 
central position in comparative rights constitutionalism, and recent exercises in 
constitutional design have bypassed the exceptionalist system of American rights 
protection in favour of transformative approaches that recognize that rights 
protection is not singular, hegemonic, or static. Canada’s Charter has demon-
strated that protecting rights within a tradition of representative democracy is 
a matter of institutional design and has shown how key institutions—namely, 
courts and legislatures—can share that responsibility. Meanwhile, Canada has 
also modelled an alternative conception of rights that is inclusive of collective 
and community identities, and that to some extent protects affi  rmative entitle-
ments. Indeed, in his article in this issue, Mark Tushnet argues that, in the last 
thirty years, the distinctive model represented by the Charter has made the 
Canadian Constitution and the Supreme Court of Canada more infl uential 
from a comparative perspective than the US Constitution and the US Supreme 
Court. Tushnet traces this ascendancy in infl uence to a variety of features of 
constitutional life in Canada, including the age of the Charter, the embrace and 
elaboration of proportionality tests, and the rejection of originalist interpretation 
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(save for the area of Aboriginal rights, as John Borrows argues). Rosalind Dixon 
emphasizes that it is not just the structural features of the Canadian Constitution, 
but also the patterns of logic and reasoning that have developed in the last 
thirty years in Canada, that off er Canadian lessons for comparative constitutional 
design. Dixon suggests that the Canadian experience shows the way in which 
particular conceptions of the prohibited grounds of discrimination can variously 
nourish or inhibit the progressive potential of equality guarantees. Evincing a 
complicated comfort with the tensions of modern constitutionalism—holding 
together, for example, equally fi erce commitments to legislative sovereignty and 
the supremacy of rights, to the respect for diff erence and the protection of 
equality—Canada and its Charter have contributed important ideas to global 
patterns of rights constitutionalism. 
Th e articles that form this special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal were 
written for a symposium held at Osgoode Hall Law School in September of 
2012, a symposium that took the 30th anniversary of the Charter as an occasion 
to refl ect on the state of critical and comparative constitutional rights theory. Th is 
event brought together a group of leading constitutional scholars from Canada, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, to discuss practical, 
theoretical, and comparative dimensions of the study of the Charter and of rights 
constitutionalism more generally. Th e day’s conversations were facilitated by four 
discussants, who are distinguished constitutional scholars in their own right—Sonia 
Lawrence, Robert Leckey, Jennifer Nedelsky, and Bruce Ryder—and were joined in 
by graduate and J.D. students from Osgoode Hall Law School, the University 
of Toronto, and McGill University. As guest editors, we are grateful to the student 
editors of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal and to the editor-in-chief, Professor Stepan 
Wood, for their skill and professionalism in bringing this collection to publication. 
Together, these articles off er a formidable collection of insights on rights within 
democracies, on how societies and institutions accommodate change, on how 
political communities and institutions speak to each other, and on how consti-
tutional transformations and innovations are shared and developed as they move 
across borders. Th ough they were occasioned by the 30th anniversary of the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, these articles collectively look forward, imagining the 
frontiers and points of struggle for constitutional justice, and participating in 
the core task of all constitutional thought: wrestling with the role of state and 
community in the pursuit of social and political justice.  
“[T]he state,” as Scott wisely observes, “is a work of art that is never fi nished.”4
4.  Scott, supra note 1 at ix.
